Supreme Court holds that High Courts cannot impose timelines on investigation or grant protection from arrest while dismissing quashing petitions.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Mohd Arshad Khan & Anr. [Criminal Appeal Nos. 5610-5612 of 2025] dated December 19, 2025 held that High Courts, while declining to quash criminal proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the CrPC, cannot simultaneously impose fixed timelines for completion of investigation or grant blanket protection from arrest till cognizance is taken by the concerned court. The Court held that timelines on investigation should be imposed reactively (where there is demonstrated undue delay or stagnation) and not prophylactically (from the beginning as a preventive measure). The Court further held that protection from arrest while declining quashing petition is legally impermissible and amounts to granting anticipatory bail without satisfying the conditions under Section 438 CrPC. The Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court's directions and reaffirmed the binding precedent laid down in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, cautioning all High Courts against passing such legally untenable orders. The Court emphasized that precedents must be applied with reference to material facts and not mechanically, following the principle laid down by Earl of Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case arose from an investigation directed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, STF Headquarters, Lucknow, pursuant to an anonymous petition received regarding procurement of arms licenses through fraudulent means.

The investigation, conducted by the Special Task Force (STF), revealed that certain persons had procured and used arms licenses by submitting forged documents and false affidavits. Based on documentary records, reports submitted by the Additional District Magistrate (City), Arms Section, Agra, statements of complainants and accused persons, and scrutiny of license files and related documents, serious irregularities were discovered.

A report dated January 31, 2025 recommended registration of a criminal case and further investigation. Consequently, FIR dated May 24, 2025 was registered as Case Crime No. 33 of 2025 at Police Station Nai Ki Mandi, District Agra under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3/25/30 of the Arms Act, 1959.

Allegations Against Respondent No. 1 - Mohd. Arshad Khan:

The investigation revealed that Arshad Khan, son of Ahmed Ali, procured five arms licenses bearing numbers 6365, 6491, 6415, 6316 and 6248 (all Tajganj) by using forged PAN card, Aadhaar card and driving license. In these forged documents, his date of birth was shown as January 15, 1985, whereas official records indicated his year of birth as 1988. Prior to issuance of licenses in 2006, his date of birth in records was January 15, 1988.

It was alleged that the alteration in date of birth was made deliberately to show a lower age with the object of presenting himself as a skilled marksman, obtaining undue benefits, and enabling import of arms and ammunition from abroad on the basis of multiple arms licenses.

During investigation, despite repeated notices, Arshad Khan did not furnish purchase invoices, import documents or passport details and did not cooperate fully with the inquiry. It was alleged that arms licenses were obtained by knowingly using forged documents.

Allegations Against Respondent No. 2 - Muhammad Zaid Khan:

Investigation found that arms license number 1227/03 had been obtained by submitting forged documents and false affidavits. In the license records, his date of birth was shown as November 25, 1975, whereas his actual date of birth was found to be November 25, 1972. This discrepancy was detected on the basis of documentary evidence examined during inquiry, and it was alleged that the arms license was issued on the strength of these false particulars.

Allegations Against Respondent No. 3 - Sanjay @ Sanjay Kapoor:

Sanjay Kapoor was serving at the relevant time as Arms Clerk in the office of the Additional District Magistrate, Agra, and has since retired under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. The investigation prima facie found that he, along with the concerned arms license holders, was involved in acts relating to forgery, concealment of material facts and submission of false affidavits in connection with processing and issuance of arms licenses.

High Court Proceedings:

All three accused-respondents filed petitions before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the FIR and protection from arrest.

The Allahabad High Court, vide identically worded orders dated June 16, 2025, July 4, 2025 and July 4, 2025 respectively:

1. Declined to quash the FIR - disposed of the writ petitions without allowing the main prayer for quashing

2. Directed completion of investigation within 90 days - imposed a fixed timeline on the investigating officer

3. Granted protection from arrest till the concerned court takes cognizance of the matter

4. Made protection conditional - provided that in case of non-cooperation, respondents could file recall application

The High Court relied on its earlier decision in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7463/2024 (Shobhit Nehra vs. State of U.P.) without examining whether the factual matrix of that case applied to the present matters.

The State of Uttar Pradesh approached the Supreme Court challenging these directions, particularly the imposition of timeline and grant of protection from arrest.

ISSUE

Whether the High Court, while declining to quash an FIR and disposing of a quashing petition without granting the main relief prayed for, can legally:

(i) Direct time-bound completion of investigation by imposing a fixed timeline of 90 days on the investigating officer as a prophylactic measure from the beginning of investigation, and

(ii) Grant blanket protection from arrest to the accused till cognizance is taken by the concerned court, particularly when such directions are passed mechanically by relying on a precedent without reference to the material facts of that precedent and without demonstrating how those facts apply to the present case, and whether such directions are sustainable in law in view of the binding precedent laid down by this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and State of Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani?

HELD BY THE COURT

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 5610-5612 of 2025 held that:

On Imposition of Timeline for Investigation:

The Court observed that investigation of an offence is a long, winding road full of ups and downs and is not predictable in the true sense. There can be delays, witnesses may hesitate or resile from statements, documentary evidence may turn out to be unusable, and many other possibilities may occur. Legal proceedings frequently intersect with investigation and affect its pace and direction - applications for anticipatory bail, regular bail, court directions for further investigation, change of investigating officer, etc.

The Court held that the investigative process may be straight at times, full of twists and turns at others, and frustratingly roundabout before reaching a definitive conclusion. While this cannot be an excuse for avoidable delay, it represents the practical reality of investigation.

The Court opined that speedy trial, which necessarily includes timely and diligent investigation, has been recognized as an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution and is essential to fairness and credibility of the criminal justice system. Undue delay prejudices not only the accused but also the victim and society at large.

The Court held that Courts have consistently recognized that directing a time-bound investigation must remain the exception rather than the norm. Investigation is a product of many factors and the law accords investigating agencies a reasonable degree of latitude. At the same time, the Constitution does not permit investigations to remain open-ended.

The Court observed that the right to speedy trial forms an essential part of Article 21, as first recognized in Hussainara Khatoon (1) vs. State of Bihar and elaborated in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak. It is in this constitutional setting that courts have, in appropriate cases, intervened where delay itself begins to cause prejudice.

The Court held that where there is evident stagnation, unexplained inaction, or a pattern of delay that cannot be justified by the nature or complexity of the case, judicial directions fixing timelines have been considered warranted. In Vineet Narain vs. Union of India, the Court emphasized need for prompt and effective investigation. In Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar, the Court reaffirmed that investigations cannot continue endlessly and prolonged unexplained delay may infringe Article 21.

However, the Court cautioned in Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja that manner and pace of investigation ordinarily lie within the investigator's domain and courts should not routinely or mechanically direct time-bound investigation.

The Court concluded: "The necessary conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that timelines are not drawn by the Court to be followed by the investigators/the executive right from the beginning, for that would clearly amount to stepping on the toes of the latter. Timelines are therefore imposed at a point where not doing so would have adverse consequences i.e., there is material on record demonstrating undue delays, stagnation, or the like. In sum, timelines are imposed reactively and not prophylactically."

The Court held that as the timelines imposed by the High Court were prophylactic (from the beginning) and not reactive (in response to demonstrated delay), they needed to be interfered with and were accordingly set aside.

On Protection from Arrest:

The Court observed that the High Court may have been justified in granting protection from arrest in the factual context of Shobhit Nehra (supra) because that case had the backdrop of a long-standing civil dispute along with familial animosity. The dispute had reached the Supreme Court in 1998 and proceedings were still ongoing. Given that background, arrest on basis of FIR simpliciter may have had an impact on Article 21 rights of the accused therein.

However, the Court held that how the directions issued in Shobhit Nehra apply to the instant facts is unclear, for the impugned orders do not discuss the same. The directions in that case were applied without appropriate reference to facts of the present case.

The Court invoked the principle laid down by Earl of Halsbury LC in Quinn v. Leathem: "every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found."

The Court held that when a Court or counsel relies upon a judgment, it is not a mechanical exercise. It needs to and should reflect application of mind in connection with evaluation of material facts of the two cases, since they are essential to decision making. Only those facts that bear a direct nexus to the legal principle applied constitute the material factual substratum of the precedent.

The Court held that this exercise was ex facie absent in the impugned orders. The directions in Shobhit Nehra, which were justified in that factual context, were applied without appropriate reference to facts of this case. The same cannot be said to be in accordance with law.

On the Legal Position Regarding Protection from Arrest:

The Court categorically held that Neeharika Infrastructure (supra) absolutely clarifies the position. The Court quoted extensively from the three-Judge Bench decision in Neeharika Infrastructure which deprecated the practice of High Courts directing police not to arrest even while declining to quash the petition.

The Court quoted the key observations from Neeharika Infrastructure:

• Such direction amounts to an order under Section 438 CrPC, albeit without satisfaction of conditions of the said provision, and is legally unacceptable

• "It is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable to pass an order directing police not to arrest till investigation is completed while declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is not appropriate to stay investigation"

• This kind of order is really inappropriate and unseemly and has no sanction in law

• Courts should oust and obstruct unscrupulous litigants from invoking inherent jurisdiction on drop of a hat to file application for quashing and then seek relief by interim order

  
  

The Court noted with pain that despite law laid down in State of Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani (reaffirmed in Neeharika Infrastructure), many High Courts continue to pass such orders. The law declared by Supreme Court is binding on all High Courts and not following it would have very serious implications in administration of justice.

The Court held that without providing any justification for granting protection from arrest despite the position of law laid down in Neeharika (supra), the impugned orders cannot sustain. The Court set aside the condition granting protection from arrest.

Final Directions:

The Court allowed the State's appeals and:

1. Set aside the timelines imposed by the High Court for completion of investigation

2. Set aside the protection from arrest granted to the accused-respondents

3. Granted two weeks' interim protection to the respondents, after which all actions as permissible in law will follow

RELEVANT SECTIONS

Article 226 of the Constitution of India - "Power of High Courts to issue certain writs"

Confers upon High Courts the power to issue writs including in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, certioram, etc., for enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose. This extraordinary constitutional power enables High Courts to grant reliefs in appropriate cases, but must be exercised within constitutional limits and in accordance with law declared by the Supreme Court.

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - "Saving of inherent powers of High Court"

"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

This provision preserves the inherent powers of High Courts but does not authorize passing orders that have no sanction in law or contradict established legal principles.

Section 438 of the CrPC - "Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest"

Provides for anticipatory bail with specific conditions and safeguards. High Courts cannot bypass this provision by granting protection from arrest through inherent jurisdiction while declining to quash proceedings.

Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - "Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property"

Provides punishment for cheating, which includes fraudulent or dishonest inducement.

Sections 467, 468, 471 of the IPC - "Forgery-related offences"

Section 467: Forgery of valuable security, will, etc. Section 468: Forgery for purpose of cheating Section 471: Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record

Sections 3/25/30 of the Arms Act, 1959 - Offences relating to prohibition of acquisition, possession of arms and ammunition without license and punishment for such offences.

Article 21 of the Constitution of India - "Protection of life and personal liberty"

"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

The right to speedy trial (including timely investigation) is an integral part of Article 21.

PARI MATERIA / CASES REFERRED

1. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra - (2021) 19 SCC 401

• Three-Judge Bench decision

• Held that High Courts cannot direct police not to arrest while declining to quash FIR

• Such direction amounts to anticipatory bail without satisfying Section 438 CrPC conditions

• Legally unacceptable and has no sanction in law

• Binding precedent reaffirmed and emphasized by present judgment

  
  

2. State of Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani - (2017) 2 SCC 779

• Deprecated practice of directing no arrest while dismissing quashing petition

• Held such orders are absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable

• Inappropriate and unseemly with no sanction in law

• Courts should oust unscrupulous litigants from abusing inherent jurisdiction

3. Quinn v. Leathem - [1901] AC 495 (UK House of Lords)

• Earl of Halsbury LC's principle: Every judgment must be read as applicable to particular facts proved

• Generality of expressions are not expositions of whole law but governed by particular facts

• Applied by Supreme Court to emphasize need for factual application of precedents

4. State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra - 1967 SCC OnLine SC 17

• Approved the Quinn v. Leathem principle in Indian context

• Emphasized need to examine material facts before applying precedents

5. Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan - (2005) 2 SCC 42

• Reiterated that precedents must be applied with reference to material facts

• Mechanical application without factual analysis is impermissible

6. All India Haj Umrah Tour Organisers Assn. vs. Union of India - (2023) 2 SCC 484

• Recent reaffirmation of principle that judgments must be read in factual context

7. State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal - 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

• Recognized that High Courts may exercise writ jurisdiction to interdict criminal proceedings at threshold in appropriate cases

• Laid down categories where quashing is permissible

8. Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate - (1998) 5 SCC 749

• Reiterated principles of Bhajan Lal regarding quashing jurisdiction

9. Sunil Batra vs. Delhi Administration - (1978) 4 SCC 494

• Writ of habeas corpus invoked to protect personal liberty in custodial violations

10. Nilabati Behera vs. State of Orissa - (1993) 2 SCC 746

• High Court's writ jurisdiction in cases of illegal detention

11. Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. - (2008) 2 SCC 409

• Clarified that while CrPC remedies should ordinarily be pursued, constitutional jurisdiction remains available in appropriate cases

12. Joginder Kumar vs. State of U.P. - (1994) 4 SCC 260

• Writ jurisdiction used to enforce procedural safeguards during arrest

13. D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal - (1997) 1 SCC 416

• Laid down custodial safeguards enforceable through writ jurisdiction

14. Hussainara Khatoon (1) vs. State of Bihar - (1980) 1 SCC 81

• Constitution Bench - First recognized right to speedy trial as part of Article 21

15. Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak - (1992) 1 SCC 225

• Constitution Bench - Elaborated on right to speedy trial including investigation

16. Vineet Narain vs. Union of India - (1998) 1 SCC 226

• Emphasized need for prompt and effective investigation

• Delay risks allowing serious matters to drift without resolution

17. Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu vs. State of Bihar - 2025 INSC 1339

• Recent judgment reaffirming investigations cannot continue endlessly

• Prolonged unexplained delay between FIR and chargesheet may infringe Article 21

18. Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja - (2003) 6 SCC 195

• Cautioned against routine or mechanical directions for time-bound investigation

• Manner and pace of investigation ordinarily lie within investigator's domain

19. Shobhit Nehra vs. State of U.P. - Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7463/2024 (Allahabad High Court)

• Case relied upon by Allahabad High Court in impugned orders

• Involved long-standing family dispute with civil litigation backdrop dating to 1998

• Protection from arrest justified in that specific factual context

• Distinguished by Supreme Court - Facts of that case did not apply to present matters

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